1942 American Federation of Musicians (AFM) Recording Ban

The ATM ban was primarily a protest against the increased use of records in public performances, on radio and in jukeboxes.

In 1942 the conflict  between America Society of Composers and Publishers and the record companies was a battle between one long time influential group and another that was instituting technological changes that were reshaping popular music. The battle  was over the value of popular music, both economic and cultural. the battle was being played out against the backdrop of World War I I, wherein basic features of America's cultural identity were being challenged.

In the 1940s, one of musicians’ most reliable sources of work was playing live on radio stations. So when radio began experimenting with playing recorded music instead of live performances, the American Federation of Musicians ordered a boycott in 1942.

In early 1942 AFM  president James Petrillo had decided not to pursue new contracts with recording companies whose pacts expired July 31, 1942. This act would lead to one of the longest work stoppages in American labor history.

Power had shifted to broadcasters. AMF protested against the use of records in public performances destroying the livelihood musicians by using prerecorded instead of live performances. The broadcaster's eventual victory would push forward the discovery and development of new artists and styles. canned music

AFM president James C. Petrillo

James Petrillo had long thought that recording companies should pay royalties on the use records on which AFM members were used.  In 1936, while head of the Chicago AFM branch, Petrillo instituted a regional recording ban that lasted eighteen months. Taking notice, AFM endorsed such bans as a means of protecting the livelihood of its members. In 1940 Petrillo became national president of AMF. His predecessor Pat Joseph Weber saw AFM as standard bearer for quality music, whose primary function was to expose the masses to  high quality live performance by its members. When Petrillo replaced Weber, Nicholas Devore of the Musician charged Petrillo "machinated his way into control" of AFM simply to satisfy a lust for power. Bothered by Petrillo's attempt to bring the American Guild of Musical Artists into the AFM, Devore called him a petty dictator. For Petrillo job protection was paramount, while promoting quality music was at best second. That attitude led American Mercury to name him the " Mussolini of Music." However, Petrillo claimed "We have only one problem, canned music" meaning recorded music.

The fact is that Petrillo was reacting to a legitimate concern. The record industry was booming in 1940 as the depression came to an end. In 1941 record production had almost doubled and the jukebox industry was expanding. AFM's International Board's belief was records played over the radio or in public via jukeboxes was cutting into the number of live engagements for its members. Some musicians were contributing to their demise by playing on recordings, though most were not. Also dance halls and hotels that had been placed on AFM unfair list for violations against union rules could evade punishment by replacing live music by playing records instead.

As jukeboxes expanded different offerings available to consumers, it revitalized recording industry by making available commercially marginal styles (hillbilly and race) that had suffered during depression. Blues and country music at this were basically unheard on radio but, had not disappeared.

Petrillo not only feared the jukeboxes but, recorded music and transcription services. There was a demand for cheap radio programming by small town and shoe string stations to replace more expensive live programs, dramas and comedies. Small stations unaffiliated with networks or dependent on them for only small portion, who were unable put on full programming subscribed to transcription services  These provided them with inexpensive, pre-recorded shows. NBC adopted new policy in 1941 allowing record  material on its network.

In late thirties disc jockeys began popping up. Al Jarvis in Los Angeles and Stan Shaw in New York were among the first to develop strong ratings and loyal followings. Martin Block turned his Make Believe Ballroom into long lasting and influential prototype for what radio would later become in the fifties. These shows showed how inexpensive, yet profitable disc jockey programs could be. Petrillo saw them as a threat to his members livelihood.

Jukeboxes were the more immediate threat than radio as it allowed owners of taverns, clubs, corner stores to provide customers music while avoiding live shows. Also the operators did not have to pay royalties under copyright law as it didn't meet the definition of public performance for profit. The owners only needed to pay attention to the taste of the users and stock the machines accordingly. This was especially important to country and blues artists since fans unable to afford these records could simply go to local hangouts to hear them. It also increased recording opportunities for artists by encouraging local labels that promoted local favorites.

Petrillo feared impact that this would have on his members as jukeboxes in a club or tavern was an omen that they would be phasing out.  the hose bands.

The war had a huge impact on the jukebox industry as Southern workers moved to defense jobs in the North and West Coast. These homesick, rural  migrants were so supportive of acts that reminded them of back home that hillbilly acts had huge success, fueling the rise of honky tonk style that evolved to rockabilly in the fifties.

The war helped the jukebox industry as shortages of material, especially shellac, forced limits on record production. This meant that record labels  had to be  more choosy in what the recorded.  It also meant that consumers unable find hits in stores might still find them on the jukebox.  Also the draft of performers forced radio to increase the use of records and transcriptions to compensate.

Petrillo's first move as AFM President  was to solidify his position by getting rid of the American Guild of Musical Artist, bring their members into the AFM and force the unaffiliated Boston Symphony Orchestra to join. After this Petrillo on August 1 1942 told the record companies that "members will not play or contract for recordings, transcriptions or any other form of mechanical reproductions of music," thus beginning a strike. It meant no union musician could make commercial recordings for any record company. Union musicians were to be allowed to play on radio programs and other kinds of musical entertainment, but not in a recording session.

After the announcement of ban and before the expiration of contracts, Petrillo's opponents worked furiously, record and transcription companies packed their studio schedules to get a much on records as possible before losing musicians. They also hired public relations firms to put out arguments that only a small percentage of union membership made their living in music, most only doing occasional jobs to supplement regular income. That many members in localities outside the big cities had only irregular opportunities to perform. Yet AFM listed such inactive members as unemployed to inflate statistics. With these charges it was thought Petrillo would back down, but he didn't

It was then thought that Petrillo had painted himself into a corner, alienating both industry and public. It didn't happen and his position was strengthen by the endorsement by AFM and parent American Federation of Labor. The Justice Department proposed a civil suit was where he should seek his objectives  A strongly worded resolution from the Federation resolved "The objectives sought by the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice would prohibit the use of peaceful measures in furtherance of labor disputes, would deny the exercise of freedom of speech and would impose involuntary servitude upon the workers of the county"  A Federal judge agreed and refused the Justice's request for an injunction, a decision that would be upheld by the Supreme Court early in 1944

In February 1943, Petrillo submitted his plan for a resolution which called for a fixed fees, the amount to be negotiated with the AFM for each record, transcription or mechanical device could be sold if the master was produced with AFM members. The money received would be used to reduce unemployment of musicians, further music appreciation and provide free concerts. This proposal was rejected on the grounds it violated legal sanctions governing the relationships between employers and unions, obstructed technological advances.

That summer  National Association of Broadcasters announced plans to form a company union modeled on their publishing and licensing group. BMI would  try to take away AFM members with five year guaranteed jobs, with time split between radio, records and movie work. The hope was that once records received air and jukebox exposure, Petrillo would end the ban. When this the plan failed the coalition of recording interests, jukebox operators and broadcasters fell apart.

Decca signed an independent agreement with AFM in late 1943. Decca situation was unique as it was was strictly a record company not a broadcasting subsidiary unlike the other two. .

In the summer of 1944 the War Labor Board called for an immediate end of the ban and a negotiation of fees to be paid by the remaining record company holdouts, Victor and Columbia. Both parties were unhappy with the this. The record companies were unhappy that WLB sanctioned a direct payment of fees to the union and Petrillo that the Decca agreement wasn't the model for all future contracts and refused to comply.

AFM attorney Joseph Paddy argued that the WLB had no jurisdiction in the matter that did not impede the war effort. The matter was turned over to Fred Vinson director of the Office of Economic Stability.  Vinson who had doubts about his power to impose sanctions and force compliance. Those were the calling up of musicians to be re-examined for the draft or ordering the War Man Power Commission to force them to take defense jobs, since the ban did not impede the war effort

Finally, President Roosevelt  made a direct appeal to Petrillo which was turned down. Petrillo claimed that conditions had changed after Decca and one hundred smaller record labels had already settled no one could complain that union members weren't making records,.there was no threat to national morale, nor was there any legitimate reason for Victor or Columbia to demand concessions not granted companies that already signed contracts with the union.

Roosevelt vowed to find a legal way to to settle the ban. Columbia and Victor could wait no longer as their competitive positions had worsened since Decca signed  and they believed they had used all their legal and government options, they signed..

The ban directly and indirectly altered business and creative practices and changes in public opinion about popular music and its role in in America's cultural and social life. It fostered the growth in independent labels that were to become responsible for emerging styles like bebop, rhythm and blues and the crossover potential of country and western and specialized radio programming. economically viable. The commercial and artistic impacts of the independents would not have happened without the ban.

Petrillo won the battle but ultimately lost the war as the consequences for the union were significant. The recording ban went beyond the concessions won by the union as the ban directly and indirectly changed business,creative practices and changes in public attitudes about popular music and its role in America's cultural life. Many of those changes contributed to an increase in the independent record companies. It also brought awareness of the racial boundaries in the music industry.

The ban that was supposed to secure musician employment by opposing records and jukeboxes had no long term impact on either. The new contracts between the union and record companies did nothing to stop the lose of jobs created by recording since there were no provisions curtailing recordings or the use of records in jukeboxes or broadcasting. The failure of the agreement to adequately address the job issue would lead to  a second ban. in 1948.

ASCAP had virtual monopoly on Tin Pan Alley while BMI by 1945 controlled most country, blues and r&b ensuring regular income for performers and companies, started to fund publishing efforts. devoted to those styles. The major players still controlled most profitable music but, these networks were no taste setters. More and more stations were choosing music based on local preferences. This benefited BMI as it built support by sponsoring those  among programmers e who wanted to expand into publishing and recording. Since ASCAP payment system demanded wide spread appeal before a song generated royalties there was little benefit for part-timers and small operations in membership. in the 40s it was largely irrelevant because the industry was geared to mass success but, by the 50s it had change. independent operations, both recording and broadcasters offered viable alternatives and BMI's support paid off big.

In 1948 Petrillo again barred union musicians from recording. Again he was trying to improve their bargaining position and protesting the Taft-Harley Act on the union's power. He felt that Taft-Harley threaten the Recording and Transcription fund. He wanted more paid to the union to help offset unemployment. the most important concession won. the ban lasted a year before theft was restricted long term effects

Record companies again built up inventories. With hundreds more record companies, broadcasters and jukebox operators wouldn't run out of music. Many employed non-union performers, hillbillys and bluesman ignored by the majors who failed to see their potential. By 1950 r&b was dominated by independents when market expanded to white teenagers the majors scrambled to catch up.

When the ban ended, months later the musicians returned to the studios to find vocalists in charge. Vocalists belonged to their own union, which did not strike, and took advantage to establish the dominance of lead singers and solo vocalists. Other forces helped undermine the “big band” and performances involving full orchestras -- among them the demise of ballrooms as central to the music scene, but the strike helped usher in a new age: that of the crooner in the limelight.